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Summary: We study the loan contracting model of Gale and Hellwig (1985) under general
assumptions of risk aversion of the borrower and diverse subjective beliefs of the borrower
and lender about the outcome of the investment.  We continue to assume the lender must
incur cost in order to observe the outcome of the project, while the borrower can (ex-post)
observe the state at no cost.  We claim that once we introduce differences in probability
beliefs into the contracting environment the complex relationship between two trading parties
becomes focal.  Contract terms reflect return on capital, insurance and risk sharing arising
from the motive to trade on the differences in probabilities.  This trading is desired by the
parties since there are no financial markets where agents could purchase insurance for state
contingencies hence private contracting replaces markets for contingent claims.  Under such
conditions verification states are not necessarily interpreted as “default” states.  We
characterize the optimal contract and show that (i) the contractual payoff in verification states
varies by states in accord with risk aversion and probability belief of the borrower, and (ii) the
verification region may consist of many intervals.  We provide conditions and examples to
show that when the borrower is more optimistic than the bank, there may be fewer
verification regions and the terms of an optimal contract may be simplified.S (
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1. Introduction
The seminal work of Gale and Hellwig (1985) extended Townsend’s (1978) contracting
approach to incentive compatible debt contracts and has had a significant impact on the way markets
for loans are being studied.  Their model is commonly explored in textbooks on banking theory (e.g.
Xavier and Rochet (1997) Chapter 4) and is often used as a benchmark in applications (e.g. Boyd
and Smith (1994), Khalil and Parigi (1998), Mookherjee and Png (1989)).  We briefly review the
basic set-up of the model.  An entrepreneur has equity capital N used as collateral when seeking to
borrow the amount B from the bank. He aims to invest the amount  N + B  in a risky project whose
return depends on a stochastic state s,S, and consume his payoff.  The standard assumptions are: (i)
consumption is non-negative, (ii) both the borrower and the bank are risk-neutral, (iii) the borrower
and the bank hold the same probability beliefs about the distribution of  s.  The optimal contract
stipulates the payment by the project as a function of the state but the state is ex-post asymmetrically
observed.  The entrepreneur can observe the realized state at no cost while the bank needs to incur
an audit cost of c(s, B + N) $ 0 in order to verify the state.  Hence, the contract specifies the
payment as a function of the announced state.  A bank’s decision to verify the state is commonly
interpreted as a default by the borrower who announces that he cannot meet the contractual
payment.  The conclusion is a standard loan contract partitioning the set of states S into two






observation cost c to verify the state and an interval  of high investment returns where no state
verification takes place.  If s ,  the borrower is in default and consumes nothing while the bank
receives all available resources.  For s ,  the payment to the bank is a constant independent of
the state, contracted to cover the loan B  plus interest, and the borrower receives the balance.
Gale and Hellwig briefly considered how the contract might change if the borrower is risk
averse.  Garino and Simmons (2001) study in further detail the optimal contract when the borrower
is risk averse but both papers assume that the borrower and the bank hold the same probability belief
about the state. Assuming the verification cost is independent of the state, they show that when the
borrower is risk-averse he consumes a constant positive quantity when the state is verified in  and
he is in default, but   is still an interval of low return states.  If there are any non-verification states,
then due to the bank’s verification cost, there will normally be a discontinuity in the payoff schedule
of the borrower at the point of transition from verification to non-verification interval.  With a view
to remove such discontinuity, and inspired by the Innes’ (1990) model of unobserved effort level,
Garino and Simmons (2001) explore the idea that the borrower can destroy output.  Under such
indirect assumption of endogenous effort, they show that the consumption level of the borrower
would be monotonic with no discontinuities in the state contingent schedule.
There is no reason to believe an optimizing entrepreneur is less risk averse than any other
economic agent, and hence Gale and Hellwig’s (1985) and Garino and Simmons’s (2001) discussion
of risk aversion reflects a desire to adapt the model to more realistic conditions.  The assumption that
the bank is risk neutral is realistic due to the bank’s diversified loan portfolio, but this fact brings out
a fundamental aspect of the contract.  Consider the realistic case when the borrower is risk averse. 
The bank’s ability to diversify enables it to become an insurance agent for the borrower.  The needS (
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for such insurance arises from the fact that markets for contingent claims do not exist due to
asymmetric information,  hence the borrower cannot purchase as much insurance as he desires.  This
means that private contracting between the borrower and the bank becomes an institution used to
improve risk sharing arrangements that should ideally be performed via financial markets.  But then
the simple borrower - lender relationship no longer characterizes the problem.  We are now engaged
in the analysis of the trading pattern between two partners in a multifaceted economic relationship. 
Nevertheless, under the assumptions of Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Garino and Simmons (2001),
the effect of risk aversion is minimal.  The bank provides the borrower with default insurance in the
form of constant utility (instead of zero payoff) over the verification set    of low project returns,
but the simple formal structure of a standard loan contract remains intact.
Our interest in this paper is to extend the analysis of Gale and Hellwig (1985) to an
environment where the borrower is risk averse but where he also has a probability belief about the
distribution of the state s which is different from the bank.  But once we introduce differences in
probability beliefs, the full force of the complex relationship between two trading parties becomes
focal.  If probabilities matter then we deal with investment opportunities of an entrepreneur who
seeks an investment of capital from a financial institution with a diversification capability.  The
relationship between these parties  may involve complex terms of return on capital, insurance and
risk sharing which arise from the motive to trade on the differences in probabilities.   This means that
in some states the agreed compensation may not be due to the real outcome of the project but rather,
it may be due to the difference in probabilities on which the parties trade. With this in mind, it may
not be useful to think of   a a set of “default” states. Instead,  is the set of states in which the
contract stipulates a payoff to the borrower that exceeds the project’s resources minus the fixedS (
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obligation to the bank.  The insured agent then makes a demand for payment by the lender to cover
his compensation.  More generally, the constraints do not prohibit the borrower from receiving a
compensation which is even larger than the total resources of the entire project.  To explain the issue
further, consider the case when   is an interval of lowest returns.  Due to risk aversion and
probability differences the lender proposes to insure the borrower by a specified function on  .  In
addition, suppose there is a region  in the middle of S (unconnected with  ) on whose
realization the lender puts very small probability while the borrower places very high probability. 
The borrower may ask to receive a large compensation on   and, in addition, that on   the
project should have no obligation to the bank.  The lending bank may be willing to guarantee the
borrower this compensation package simply because he does not believe that these outcomes are
likely.  If the lender can lower the amounts he proposed to the borrower at   (a region of high
probability for him) in exchange for higher promises on the set   (a region of low probability for
him) he may consider doing so.  Such a trade would keep the expected return of the lender at the
same level and may improve the utility of the borrower.  So the reappearance of sets like   away
from   is simply due to the differences in probabilities: the contract environment provides
opportunities for utility improving risk sharing.  One may argue that risk sharing which leads to
trades on probability differences puts the bank in a position of “speculating” on probabilities and this
is not what the function of a lending bank is.  This is exactly the point at which the bank’s motive to
maximize expected returns alters its simple role of a loan provider and turns it into a trading partner
in an environment of incomplete markets.
It is worth noting that in recent years many economists have adopted the view that
incomplete markets should not be characterized only by an absence of financial markets to trade risk5
but also by the emergence of voluntary private institutions to supplement trading opportunities
available in the market.  Indeed, some theorists consider contracting to be the correct way to model
incomplete markets (e.g. Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001)) .  Without
addressing this deeper question of selecting optimal private institutions to trade risk, we stress that a
crucial feature of contracting with risk aversion and diverse probability beliefs is the fact that it offers
a substitute for financial markets and the multiple regions of verification reflects the complex nature
of trading it implies.  Moreover, in a more general setting (e.g. to include hidden actions,  adverse
selection, among others) these regions would reflect the differential demands for state contingent
claims of the two parties involved.   But then, are we not moving further and further away from the
initial borrower-lender relationship?  Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) use the contracting
model to develop a financial accelerator and in applying the model to the U.S. economy take an
extreme position on this issue.  They argue that in advanced economies there exists intermediation
between the ownership of capital and the management of capital, hence all public capital ownership
is covered by the state verification model!  They thus do not distinguish between equity and debt
investments since they are both subject to state verification.  But in this case the Gale and Hellwig
(1985) assumptions adopted by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) are entirely inappropriate
since it is a fact that a typical capital investment involves very complex set of contingent obligations
and payments, all absent from the standard loan contract which they adopt.  
  We suggest that there are many sound reasons to focus on the case of differential probability
beliefs of the two parties.   First, it is a realistic assumption since there is a vast empirical evidence
that agents exhibit diverse probability beliefs in financial markets (see, for example, Frankel and
Froot (1987), (1990), Frankel and Rose (1995), Kandel and Pearson (1995), Kurz (2001) and6
Takagi (1991)).  Second, if  potential entrepreneurs have diverse beliefs about available projects, it is
easy to demonstrate simple selection mechanisms which result in realizations in which investors who
seek a bank loan are more optimistic than the bank about the project of their choice.  Investors who
are pessimistic about the outcomes of potential projects would generally choose not to invest at all. 
For this reason we are particularly interested in the case when an entrepreneur who seeks a loan from
the bank is more optimistic than the bank about the prospects of his project.   Third, the case of
difference in probability beliefs is a relatively simple setting of trading where we could hope to derive
the optimal contract and even be able to solve it numerically.  Other settings may be too complex to
enable a full characterization of the optimal contract.  And, indeed, our conclusions are relatively
simple and can be summarized as follows:
(A) The contractual payments to the borrower in verification states are not constant: they
vary by states in accord with risk aversion and probability belief of the borrower.  There is
substantial empirical evidence to support this result since even in states of “default” the
consumption level of a borrower is not constant. There are items (e.g. home ) not subject to
seizure by a lender; in some states the borrower may default only on some loans which are
not backed by collateral; there are often items on the balance sheet of a borrower which are
not even part of the collateral.  Finally, depending on the severity of the situation (i.e.
depending on s), if the borrower is unable to pay all his debts then under Chapter 11 he may
be able to renegotiate the loan contracts and emerge with positive consumption.
(B) The observation region may consist of many intervals and the structure of these intervals
is sensitive to the difference in probability beliefs.  This is the result which reflect the trading




Garino and Simmons (2001) explore that implication of permiting the borrowing
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entrepreneur to destroy revenue and this results in a monotonic payoff function to the borrower.  
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2. A Solution of the Contracting Problem
We consider the general contracting case where the payoff to a risk averse borrower is not
required to be monotonic.   To present our formulation we start with the following notation:
1
N - equity of the borrower;
B - amount borrowed and  C = B + N.;
S = R  the state space; +
F : S × : the production function, as function of the state s and the input of capital,
P : S 6 [0,1] - the distribution of s according to the bank;
P:  S  6 [0,1] - distribution of s according to the borrower; B
u - utility function of the borrower;
c(s , C) - verification cost depending on the state and input of capital;
d S: verification set: set of states at which observation takes place;
 - state contingent payment to borrower;
R  - payment to the bank (i.e. the loan B plus contractual interest) when state is unobserved;
r   - riskless interest rate.
We start with only three assumptions but add assumptions later to clarify the development.
Assumptions:
A.1  u is defined on  , C  and strictly concave, uN > 0, uO < 0;
2
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A.3  The probability measures induced by P and P  are equivalent. B
2.1 A Simple Tool for Characterizing the Solution of the Contracting Problem
We start by a formal statement of the Contracting Problem, which is






(1b) is a participation constraint of the bank, ensuring the bank a normal return; (1c) is the incentive
compatibility constraints making it unprofitable for the borrower to misrepresent the truth in his
report of the state in S*; (1d) is a feasibility condition on the contractual value of R.  As a matter of
notation, we denote by    a solution to this problem.  
Our strategy for characterizing the solution of problem (1) is to define simpler problems with
the same solution and then develop the first order conditions for the optimization.  In this spirit we
denote by  , for     and for a given B, the solution of the following problem (2):





[F(s,C) & <(s)]P(ds) $ k.
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(u[ˆ <C(s,k) & , P(A)
P(B)












kn 9 k. Then ˆ <C(s,kn) 8 ˆ <C(s,k) for P&a.a. s.
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(2b)
Problem (2) is much simpler than problem (1) and we derive the first order conditions for it.   Let  C 
and  k  be given such that (2) has a solution.  Let  then have the following
first order condition.   For any A, B d S and , such that P(B) > 0 and P((AcB) 1 ) = P(AcB) we
have that
(3)  .
Dividing by , and taking limits we conclude that if  P(A 1 S ) = 0 ,   and  P(B 1 S ) > 0 for o*               o*
some *, we can write the first order condition in the more useful form 
(4) .
If, however, P(B) > 0  and  (AcB) = P((AcB) 1 S ) then we have equality  in (4).   Condition (4) o*
will be used later in the development.
The key tool we use in this paper to solve the contracting problem are the results in Lemmas
1 and 2.  They provides a simple characterization of the payoff function in the optimal verification
states .
Lemma 1: Suppose  
Proof:  We first prove monotonicity by repeated use of the first order condition in (4).  Thus supposeB ' {s , S:ˆ <C(s,k) > 0 , ˆ <C(s,kN)>0 },
A ' {s , S:ˆ <C(s , k) > 0 , ˆ <C(s , kN) ' 0}, AN ' {s , S:ˆ <C(s , k) ' 0,ˆ <C(s , kN)>0}.
˜ B with P(˜ B) > 0











A,u N[ˆ <C(s,kN)] > uN[ˆ <C(s,k)], ˜ B
uN[ˆ <C(s,kN)] < uN[ˆ <C(s,k)].
ˆ B d Bw i t hP ( ˆ B) > 0











AN,u N[ˆ <C(s,kN)] < uN[ˆ <C(s,k)] ˆ B
uN[ˆ <C(s,kN)] > uN[ˆ <C(s,k)].
¯ < s.t. for P&a.a. s, ˆ <C(s,kn) 8 ¯ <(s).
˜ B with P(˜ B) > 0, ¯ < <¯ <C(@ ,k).
m
S
[F(s,C) & ¯ <(s)]P(ds) ' k '
m
S
[F(s,C) & ˆ <C(s,k)]P(ds)
BN,¯ < >ˆ <C(@ ,k).
n,ˆ <C(@,kn)>ˆ <C(@,k).
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k > kN and define the following sets:     
 and    
Now suppose P(A) > 0.  There must be a measurable set    on which either 
 Hence, by FOC (4) we have
(5)
which is a contradiction, since on    while on    we must have
  We thus conclude that  P(A) = 0.
Suppose now there is a measurable set    on which the inequality
 holds.  Using the FOC (4) we deduce that
(6)
which is a contradiction, since on  , while on    we must have
 This proves almost sure monotonicity.
Now let k  9 k.  Then there is    Suppose that on n
some measurable    Since
there must be some measurable set BN with P(BN) > 0 s.t. on   But this is in
contradiction with the almost sure monotonicity that was just established, since then there would be a
measurable subset of  BN with positive measure on which for large    Hence, ˆ < ' ˆ <C(@,k)
˜ < , ˜ S
( , ˜ R, ˜ B
˜ k such that ˜ v(s) ' ˆ v˜ C(s, ˜ k) s , ˜ S
( ˜ C ' N % ˜ B.
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[F(s, ˜ B % N)] & <(s)]P(ds) $ ˆ k ,
<(s) $ F(s,˜ B % N) & R, œ s , ˜ S
(
˜ < >F ( s ,˜ B % N)& R, P& a.s ˜ < ' F(s,˜ B % N)& R
ˆ <







ˆ < … ˜ <
, >0,l e tS , d ˜ S
(
›* >0s . t .˜ <(s) & F(s, ˜ B % N) & R<* Y s , S,
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 a.a. and convergence has been proven.   
Lemma 2:  Let     be a solution to the contracting problem (1).  Assume c(s , C) > 0 for
all s and C.  Then there is a   for  P - a.a   with 
Proof : Let     Then     solves the problem:





Note that    .  To see why note that if    on a set
G  of positive measure, then due to c(s , C) > 0 excluding G from the set of observations while
leaving the payoff to the borrower unchanged is profitable and would be an improvement.  Hence
(7c) almost surely will not bind. On the other hand let   solve (7) without the constraint (7c). We
then have that if    on a set of positive measure, then
.
This follows from strict concavity of  u.  Suppose then   on a set of positive measure with the
purpose of obtaining a contradiction.  For any  be a measurable set which fulfills:
P(S ) < , ,
.ˆ <
ˆ <,(s) ' max{F (s , ˜ B % N) & R % ,,ˆ <(s)} if s, S,




ˆ <,(s) ' ˆ k.
ˆ <, ' ˆ <, 9 0, ˆ <, 6 ˆ <









8ˆ <,(s) % (1 & 8)˜ <((s) > F(s, ˜ B % N) & R,œ s , ˜ S
(.
S, ,ˆ <,(s) > F(s , ˜ B % N) & R ˜ <(s) > F(s , ˜ B % N) & R
˜ S
(\S, ,˜ <(s) > F(s , ˜ B % N) & R % *





















8ˆ <, % (1 & 8) ˜ <
˜ < ˜ < ' ˆ < a.e. on ˜ S
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˜ k






F(s, ˜ C)P(ds) , ˆ <˜ C(@ ,k )9 0 m
˜ S
(
ˆ <˜ C(s , k)P(ds) 9 0.
k 9 & 4 ,ˆ <˜ C(s, k)84,P &a.s.
˜ k
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Now modify    as follows:
, where   is chosen such that  
Note that for , small, S  may be empty in which case  * = 0 and  .  Now, as   ,
a.s. so there is an    For that  , pick a 
 such that
This is possible because on     and     in
addition to the fact that on       for some * > 0.   By strict
concavity of  u we have
with a strict inequality for a set of s of positive P- measure.  Hence we have
   
which implies that  
 .
However, by construction,     fulfills the two constraints in (7). This contradicts the
fact that    was a solution to (7).  Thus it must be the case that    What remains
to be shown is that for some    we have that  
(8)
 Clearly, as    P - a.s., which means  
On the other hand, as     by the same argument used earlier to prove
monotonicity in Lemma 1.  Hence there is a    such that m
˜ S
(










<(s) ' constant s , ˜ S
(
<(s)' 0,s , ˜ S
(







 and (8) follows.  
Lemma 2 has a simple interpretation.  Since at  the state is known, the problem restricted
to   is an optimization with full information.  Hence the borrower’s consumption must be optimal
only subject to the participation constraint of the bank and to the condition that     is the exact
amount needed to assure the bank’s participation.  Given that these conditions are satisfied, the
optimum condition (4) simply reflects the risk aversion and probability belief of the borrower.  We
recall that when the agent is risk averse but holds the same probability belief as the bank, Gale and
Hellwig (1985) and Garino and Simmons (2001) show the solution is   for  . 
If, the agent is risk neutral and holds the same probability as the bank then we have the standard
loan contract when  .  The new dimension here is the diversity of probability beliefs
between the bank and the borrower, and Lemma 2 shows that this assumption results in a subtle
payoff schedule   which varies with the realized state in the verification set.
Lemma 2 provides a precise characterization of the optimal solution for states in   . 
Moreover, the simplicity of problem (2) enables us to show that when sufficient smoothness is
available, the solution to problem (1) can be characterized with elementary techniques of calculus.
2.1 First Order Conditions for the Optimal Solution  
We have already derived in (4) the first order conditions for problem (2).  We now combine
with the previous lemma to derive the first order conditions for problem (1). ˜ <(s) when s , ˜ S
(
A,B d ˜ S















if ˜ <(sN)>0 , ˜ <(s) > 0.
˜ <
pB ˜ <(@).
˜ C' ˜ B%N S ( , k ˜ <(s) ' ˆ <˜ C(s , k)
for s, S ( ˆ <(s) ' F(s , ˆ C) & Rf o rs , S\S (.
k ,S (
pB
( ˜ C,k,S (,R ) so ' i n f{ s:F ( s,˜ C) & R ' 0}.
S ( S (
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Necessary Condition for an Optimal Contract  
  For all    and    it is necessary that 
(9) .
If  P  and P  are differentiable in s and sN, so that they have their densities  p  and  defined in  s  and  B
sN,  then (9) can be rewritten in the form
(9a)
Note, that when P  = P,  (9) implies that     is a constant as in Gale and Hellwig (1985).  Note also B
that when p  and    are continuous so is  
Given the choice of capital  , a contract specifies  and R with ,
and    Hence, we can develop necessary conditions
for optimality in these three choice variables   and R.  Given the results in (9) and (9a) we
would like to sharpen these conditions and hence make additional assumptions: 
A.4 F   is continuous and weakly increasing in s.
A.5 c   is continuous in s and c( · , C) > 0,  P - a.s. for all C.
A.6 P   and  P  have densities     and  p  which are continuous. B
For a given feasible contract    let     It
follows that [0, s ) d .   We could state the more general condition  P( [0 , s ) 1 ) = P( [0 , s )), o                            o            o
but such generality does not add much at this point.  Also observe that  {s $ so :ˆ <˜ C(s,k) # F(s , ˜ C) & R} d S\S(,
¯ S / {s : ˆ <˜ C(s , ˜ k) > F(s , ˜ C) & ˜ R $ 0}
S ( S\S (
P(˜ S
()>0a n dP ( S \ ˜ S
()>0. ˆ S
( d {s, ˜ S
( :ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k) > 0}
sN , ˜ S
( 1 ¯ S
u[ˆ <˜ C(sN, ˜ k)] & u[F(sN, ˜ C) & R]








sN , (S\ ˜ S
() 1 ¯ S
u[ˆ <˜ C(sN, ˜ k) &u[F(sN, ˜ C) & R]








ˆ <˜ C(@, ˜ k)
sN , int ¯ S sN , ˜ S
(
P( ˜ S




, / ˜ S
( \[ s N & ,,s N % ,] ˆ S
( \[s N & , ,s N % ,]




(1[sN & ,,sN % ,]
{ˆ <˜ C(sN,˜ k) % c(s,˜ C) & [F(s,˜ C) & ˜ R]}P(ds) &
m




a conclusion which follows from incentive compatibility and the fact that  c  is non-negative.  In the
following we want to develop conditions to characterize what members of the set
 
belong to   and   respectively.
Proposition 1:  Suppose    Let    be
measurable.  For P -a.a.    we have:
(10) .
For P -a.a.    we have
(11)
Proof: In view of (2a)-(2b) we consider throughout the proof a continuous version of  .
We first prove (10) by contradiction.  Thus suppose that   and assume (i)    and (ii)
 Consider the following modification of the contract:
change the verification set    to     and on  
change the payment to the entrepreneur to    The change in the profit to the bank is
.M)A
M,





)u(, , *) '&
m
˜ S
(1[sN & , ,s N % ,]
{u[ˆ <˜ C(sN , ˜ k)] & u[F(s, ˜ C) & ˜ R]}PB(ds) %
m
ˆ S
(\[sN & , ,s N % ,]
{u[ˆ <˜ C(sN , ˜ k) % *] & u[ˆ <˜ C(sN , ˜ k)]}PB(ds) .
M)u
M,






uN[ˆ <˜ C(s,˜ k)]PB(ds)
m˜ S
( 1 [sN & , ,s N % ,]






(1[sN & ,,sN % ,]
{ˆ <˜ C(sN,˜ k) % c(s,˜ C) & [F(s, ˜ C) & ˜ R]}P(ds) &
P(ˆ S
()q*(,) % P(ˆ S
(1[sN & ,,sN % ,])q*(,)
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For P -a.a. sN, )A is differentiable in (0,0) and
.
However, )A may not be locally C  and so the implicit function theorem may not hold. The change
1
in utility is:
Since for a generic sN )u is differentiable at (0,0), (not necessarily C ) we can deduce
1
.
Now suppose that (10) did not hold.  For small enough  , > 0  define *(,) such that
.




( \[ s N & ,,sN % ,]b yq *(,)





uN[ˆ <˜ C(s , ˜ k)]PB(ds) % o2(,)
oi(,)
,
6 0a s, 6 0.
)u(,,q*(,)) '&{u[ˆ <˜ C(sN, ˜ k)] & u[F(s,˜ C) & R]}pB(sN)2, %
(q)m˜ S
(1[sN&,,sN%,]





uN[ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k)]PB(ds) % o(,).
˜ C , ˜ k,˜ S
( , ˜ R
ˆ <˜ C(ˆ s,˜ k) ' F(ˆ s,˜ C) & ˜ R
ˆ s.
sN , int S 1 (S\S () P((S\˜ S
()1[sN&,,sN%,])>0
œ , > 0.
{s , ¯ S:s # N, ˆ <˜ C(s , ˜ k) & * >F ( s ,˜ C) & ˜ R} ' {s , ¯ S:s # N}
ˆ S
(
%N ' ˆ S
(1{s , ¯ S:s < N }
& u[ˆ <˜ C(sN , ˜ k)] & u[F(sN , ˜ C) & ˜ R]}pB(sN) %






uN[ˆ <˜ C(sN , ˜ k)]PB(ds) < 0 .
(S\S ()1[sN & ,,sN % ,]
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which is > 0 for small  , > 0.  Consequently,  if we reduce the area of observation to    and
increase the payment on    the change in utility is
where     Using the definition of  *(,)  we get
By our assumption that (10) does not hold, for q close to 1 (but < 1), this expression is > 0 for small
, > 0.   But then    could not be optimal i.e. we have the desired contradiction. 
Remark:  Note that if    the inequality in (10) cannot hold in a
neighborhood of    
We turn next to prove (11).  Suppose (i)  and (ii)    
 By the remark just made, for every N there is a *  > 0 such that if 0 < * < *  then N            N
.
With this in mind, define  .  Now suppose we had
Consider the following contract modification: On   change the payment to theF(s, ˜ C) & ˜ Rt oˆ <˜ C(s,˜ k) & q*(,),
S (, ˆ S
(
%N ˆ <˜ C(s,k) & q*(,).
m (S\S()1[sN &,,sN%,]




















q*(,)uN[ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k)]}PB(ds) & o(,)
o(,)
,
6 0a s, 6 0).









uN[ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k)]}PB(ds) & o(,).
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entrepreneur from   where q > 1 and *(,) > 0 is small, and add
this set to  the set of observations.  On    change the payments to  
Everywhere else, leave the contract unchanged.  For small enough , > 0 , *(,) is defined by
The change in profit to the bank is
and for any q > 1 this quantity is positive for sufficiently small , > 0.  The change in utility for the
entrepreneur is
(where    Using the definition of  *(@) this expression is in turn equal to
Hence, for q small (but > 1) the quantity above is positive for small , > 0, contradicting the
assumed optimality of the original contract.  Hence, for all N we have& {u[ˆ <˜ C(sN, ˜ k)] & u[F(sN, ˜ C) & R]}pB(sN) %






uN[ˆ <˜ C(sN,˜ k)]PB(ds) # 0 .
˜ S
(
( ˜ C,˜ k,˜ S
( , ˜ R) ˜ < :S6U %
˜ S
( and on S\ ˜ S
(),
˜ <(s) ' ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k) F(s, ˜ C) & ˜ R<0
˜ <(s) ' ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k)
ˆ <˜ C(s,˜ k) > F(s, ˜ C) & ˜ R $ 0
u[ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k)] & u[F(s,˜ C)]
ˆ <˜ C(s,˜ k) & [F(s, ˜ C) & ˜ R] % c(s,˜ C)
>u N[ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k)]
˜ <(s) ' F(s,˜ C) & ˜ R
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Consequently, this equality also holds for N = 4 and we have proved (11)   
The interpretation of (10) and (11) are relatively simple and follows from the manner in
which we have derived them.  The first term in (10) describes the gain in expected utility per unit
of expected money spent on including the state sN in the set of observation. The second term
quantifies the gain in expected utility per unit of expected money spent on increasing the payment
to the entrepreneur marginally on the set of observations. In a state of observation the first minus
the second has to be positive. In a state of non-observation, it has to be negative (else state would
have to be included in  ).   
Under the assumptions stated in the proposition we have two corollaries which specify the
optimal contract over the entire state space.  We state and prove them next.
Corollary 1:  For an optimal contract    if we let    be the payment to the
borrower in any state s (that is both on    then we have P-a.a.:
(i)      for all  s satisfying  ;
(ii)     for all  s satisfying:
(a) ;
(b) ;
(iii)    for all  s satisfying:ˆ <˜ C(s,˜ k) > F(s, ˜ C) & ˜ R $ 0
u[ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k)] & u[F(s,˜ C)]
ˆ <˜ C(s,˜ k) & [F(s, ˜ C) & ˜ R] % c(s,˜ C)
<u N[ˆ <˜ C(s, ˜ k)]
˜ <(s) ' F(s,˜ C) & ˜ R ˆ <˜ C(s,˜ k) # F(s,˜ C) & ˜ R.
ˆ <˜ C(s , ˜ k) > 0 , ˆ <˜ C(sN , ˜ k) > 0




(uN[ˆ <˜ C(s , ˜ k)]PB(ds)
P[ˆ S
(]












(iv)    for all  s satisfying  
Proof: For s, sN such that    we have
Thus
 
Suppose now that the set of s for which both (10) and (11) hold has zero measure under
P.   Then the previous corollary provides a complete characterization of the optimal contract and
apart from a possible set of measure zero, we have the following conclusion
Corollary 2:     is a at most a countable union of intervals. 
Proof: This follows from the inequalities of Proposition 1 and the continuity of all functions
involved in the optimal contract.
 
2.2 When is  an Interval?
We now address the question of when  is   an interval?  To study it we explore a simple
conclusion one can deduce from our previous analysis.  Suppose the following conditions holdˆ <C(s,k) > 0 , œ C,œ k ,
s (
u[ˆ <C(s,k) & u[F(s,C) & R]
ˆ <C(s,k) & [F(s, ˜ C) & R] % c(s,˜ C)
' uN[ˆ <˜ C(s,k)].
S (
ˆ <˜ C(s,k) > F(s, ˜ C) & R $ 0
u[ˆ <c(s , k)] & u[F(s,C) & R]




ˆ <C(s,k) & [F(s,C) & R]
' 1.
ˆ <c(s,k) & [F(s,C) & R]
u[ˆ <c(s , k)] & u[F(s,C) & R]




(12a)      almost all s, 
(12b)  c(s , C) > 0,  œ C > 0,  œ s. 
For any  k  and  C  there is only one s =  such that
(12c)
When (12a) - (12c) hold, then   is an interval starting in 0.  This fact follows from continuity of
the functions involved and the fact that any change from observation to non-observation or from
non-observation to observation must take place in the region where 
 and thus (12c) must hold when such a change takes place.  We can
rewrite (12c) as
(13)
The following two sets of assumptions imply that (13) has a single solution for any k, C and R:
(14a)     is non-increasing in s; 
(14b)   c(s , C)  is non-decreasing in  s;  
(14c)    is  strictly decreasing in s.ˆ <c(s,k) & [F(s,C) & R]
u[ˆ <c(s,k)] & u[F(s,C) & R]






















u(x) & u(x& ))
)uN(x)
'






u(x) & u(x& ))
)uN(x)
< 0
u(x) ' x a ,0<a<1
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Or, the second set is
(15a)     is non-increasing in s;
(15b)   c(s , C) is strictly increasing in s;
(15c)     is non-increasing in s.
To explain how we derive (14c) or (15c) one may exploit the identity
(16) .
By assumption (14a) - (15a)      Since u is strictly concave we have
.
Thus if the following condition holds
(17)    
then (14c) holds.  If (17) holds with a weak inequality, (15c) holds.
Examples of (17)
(i)   .
Then we have that[uN(x) & uN(x& ))]uN(x) & uO(x)[u(x) & u(x& ))] '
[ax a & 1 & a(x& ))a & 1]axa & 1 & a(a & 1)x a & 2[xa & (x& ))a] '
& a 2[x& )]a & 1 x a & 1 % ax 2(a & 1) % a(a & 1)x a & 2(x& ))a
a 2(a&1)[x&)]a&2x a&1&a 2(a&1)x a&2(x&))a&1 ' x a&1[a 2(a&1)]{[x&)]a&2&x &1(x&))a&1}<0
u(x) '&e &ax ,a > 0
[uN(x)&uN(x&))]uN(x)&uO(x)[u(x)&u(x&))]'[ae &ax&ae &a(x&))]ae &ax%a 2e &ax[&e &ax%e &a(x&))]'0
ˆ <c(s,k) & [F(s,C) & R]
S (
when u(x) ' ax & bx 2 , M
Mx
u(x) & u(x& ))
)uN(x)
> 0
[a & 2bx& a % 2b(x& ))][a & 2bx] % 2b[ax& bx 2 & a(x & )) % b(x & ))2] ' 2b 2)2 > 0.
[0,s ) ¯ s ' 4
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which equals  0 when  ) = 0.  Next differentiate this expression w.r.t. ) to deduce that
.
Since a < 1 and  0 < x - ) < x   it follows that (17) holds.
(ii) .
In this case we have that
and  (17) holds with weak inequality.  Hence, if     is strictly decreasing,
or if it is just non-increasing while  c(s , C) is strictly increasing in s, then we can conclude that 
 is an interval.
(iii) .
In this case we have that
   
2.3 Conditions on beliefs
In our applications of the results presented here we are interested in the case when the
borrower is “optimistic” (or maybe “pessimistic”) relative to the bank.  We need to define this
concept more precisely.











{F(s , C) $ F}
F
ˆ <C(@ ,k )
uN[ˆ <C(s , k)] ' p(s)
pB(s)








ˆ <C(s , k) > 0
ˆ <C(s, k)
u “ > 0 p(s)
pB(s)
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We shall explore the following condition
(18)     . 
To interpret (18) observe that it typically requires    for small values of s while for
large values of s it requires  .  We thus interpret (18) to express the relative optimism
of the borrower.  To that end we assumed that the Radon-Nikodym derivative,   is
differentiable.  For the more general case an equivalent condition would be:
       is non-decreasing in  s.
Recalling that we have assumed that  F(s , C) is non-decreasing in s, the condition (18) means that
the relative gap between the probability that the borrower attaches to the event  
and the probability that the bank attaches to it is non-increasing as     increases.
The first order condition which is applicable to    can now be restated as
(19) .
For  P - a.a. s , sN.  If  u  is C  and    is differentiable, then (18) is equivalent to 
2
being differentiable in  s  with a derivative   which is continuous, P- a.a.   One
more implication of (18)  and (19) is that    is strictly concave in s if two conditions are






















(8 & 8B)s '
8B
8
ae &ab , œ s.
S ( ˜ C > 0 f(˜ C) $
8 & 8B
a
ˆ <˜ C(@,k) & F(s, ˜ C) S ( f(˜ C) <
8&8B
a
S ( ' ú%
ˆ <
u(x) ' x a , 0<a<1
pB(s)
p(s)
' Ds b on [0 , ¯ s),
ˆ <
a ˆ <C (s , k) a&1Ds b ' a ˆ <C(sN ,k )a&1DsNb , œs














< 1 we conclude d 2
ds 2 ˆ <C < 0 ˆ <
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Some Further Examples
(i) Suppose u(x) = - e  and that both the bank and the borrower use exponential distribution .
-ax
We then have that     where   8 > 8    so that indeed    In this B
case    is affine on its positive segment:     To see this, check
that the first order conditions hold:
If F(s , C) = f(C)s  with  f(0) = 0  and  c(s , k)  is non-decreasing in s then the set of observations, 
will always be an interval if    for an optimal contract and b > 0.     If     
then     is decreasing and  will be a compact interval. If      then 
  is possible, in which case all states are observed.
In the next example we develop a density that leads to   being increasing and concave. 
(ii)  Suppose    and that    0 else, with b > 0. 
So the first order condition for    is
so,    
.





¯ s (1&$) s &$ ,p ( s ) ' 1&"
¯ s (1&") s &" b ' " & $ and D ' (1&$)¯ s 1&"
(1&")¯ s 1&$
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The densities,   and  p  that lead to the relation    could be as follows:
 and then    .
3. Concluding Remarks
We have studied the form of the optimal financial relationship under costly state
verification making the more natural assumptions of a risk averse borrower and diverse subjective
expectations. What we have discovered is that in this more general settings the contract tends to
become more complex since it has to be sensitive to both preferences and beliefs. When
information is asymmetric resulting in incomplete markets, financial contracts act as substitutes
for markets and under such conditions a financial contract may have to serve multiple purposes. 
In our case the contract is not used only for the transfer of money between periods.  It also
provides an insurance vehicle in addition to the fact that it permits agents with different
probability beliefs to trade on their different assessment of the prospects for different future states
of the world.  Such multi faceted contracts clearly are what we find in today's financial markets.
Of course, all the theoretical possibilities allowed in our abstract framework may not have exact
real counterparts, since some features of contracts found in real markets depend not only on
preferences and beliefs but also on the institutional setting.  Moreover, real contracts may also
depend upon  other types of asymmetric information not considered in our abstract setting.
In the final part of the paper we have provided conditions under which the optimal
contract retains one feature which is often found in reality, namely that the region of observations
(which can in that case be interpreted as a region of non-performance, or bankruptcy) is a single27
interval consisting of all low-outcome states. Such a contract have the important feature that the
pay-off to the entrepreneur varies with the observed state.  We have explained that this feature is
often found in observed contracts.  In our setting this conclusion flows directly from the nature of
diversity of beliefs.
A natural extension of our work would be to isolate other classes of contracts which are
permitted in the model environment and that could be interpreted as having real world
counterparts. Such classes could be identified by specific configurations of the model parameters. 
For this reason we hope to examine further how the optimal contract varies with changes of the
parameters in our more general framework.  We are particularly interested in studying how the
contracting environment affects economic volatility. This question is motivated by the general use
of the classical Gale Hellwig model in the literature on the “Financial Accelerator” (e.g. Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist, (1999)). We plan to take up these issues in future research.
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